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Abstract
As climate change intensifies, global publics will experiencemore unusual weather and extreme
weather events. Howwill individual experiences with theseweather trends shape climate change
beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors? In this article, we review 73 papers that have studied the relationship
between climate change experiences and public opinion. Overall, wefindmixed evidence that weather
shapes climate opinions. Although there is some support for aweak effect of local temperature and
extremeweather events on climate opinion, the heterogeneity of independent variables, dependent
variables, study populations, and research designs complicate systematic comparison. To advance
research on this critical topic, we suggest that future studies pay careful attention to differences
between self-reported and objective weather data, causal identification, and the presence of spatial
autocorrelation inweather and climate data. Refining research designs andmethods in future studies
will help us understand the discrepancies in results, and allow better detection of effects, which have
important practical implications for climate communication. As the global population increasingly
experiences weather conditions outside the range of historical experience, researchers, commu-
nicators, and policymakers need to understand how these experiences shape-and are shaped by-public
opinions and behaviors.
1. Introduction
Climate change perceptions shape both individual and
societal responses to the climate crisis. For example, an
individual who dismisses the existence of climate
changemay underestimate the risk of extremeweather
events and, consequently, may not take appropriate
adaptive actions. Likewise, voters who do not recog-
nize the existence of climate change may be less likely
to support policies that mitigate climate risks. How-
ever, humans are poorly equipped to perceive our
changing climate directly. Instead, we perceive shifting
local weather conditions and weather-related extreme
events like heatwaves, floods, andwildfires.
Climate change is currently driving these and
other local weather conditions beyond historical ran-
ges. For example, most of the world’s population lives
in places where local temperatures have increased [1].
Our individual and societal ability to detect and
respond to these changes is critical. Can publics accu-
rately perceive shifting temperatures? Do perceptions
of local weather trends and weather events shift public
climate perceptions, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors?
Do individuals attribute these experiences to climate
change? Can these perceptions prompt increased pol-
icy action as climate impacts intensify [2–4]? These are
all empirical questions that have drawn the attention
of social scientists over two decades.
In this article, we review scholarship on how per-
sonal experiences with environmental phenomena
(including weather and weather-related events) are
associated with climate change perceptions, beliefs,
attitudes, behaviors, and policy support. We collec-
tively refer to these constructs as public opinion about
climate change or climate opinions. As we show,
despite extensive research efforts, the relationship
between weather and climate opinions still remains
unclear. Several recent studies point to an association
between elevated temperatures [5–19] or extreme
weather events [20–27] with greater climate change
concern, belief that human-caused climate change is
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studies, however, do not support such a relationship
[28–34]. Prior beliefs and personal experience may
also condition weather perceptions [35–39]. For
example, an individual who is dismissive of climate
change may misperceive their own experiences with
extreme weather events, be less likely to take appro-
priate adaptive actions, and be more vulnerable to
future climate change impacts [36, 38].
Several previous reviews examine the influence of
weather on perceptions and opinions of climate
change [40–44]. Most commonly, these reviews have
identified an effect of temperature anomalies or trends
on public opinion (in this literature, anomaly refers to
a departure from the long-term average value). How-
ever, they note that there are gaps in our under-
standing of the timescales over which weather
influences public opinion [40, 45], questions about
whether personal experience shapes climate opinions
or whether pre-existing beliefs shape experiences
[41, 44], the need to study these phenomena in a wider
range of populations beyond North America and Eur-
ope [40, 41], the need for more longitudinal analyses
[40, 41], and the need for greater consistency in
research practices [40, 41].
Here, we undertake a larger and systematic review
of the growing literature on the relationship between
weather and climate opinion. We review and interpret
this literature to identify consistencies and incon-
sistencies in research findings. We then outline the
methodological factors that may explain these con-
trasting results.We particularly highlight: (1) variation
in how climate and weather4 trends are measured;
(2) inconsistencies in survey wording, sample selec-
tion and composition, and variable selection; (3) dif-
ferences in the spatial and temporal scales of survey
and weather data; (4) uneven attention to causal iden-
tification; (5) statistical complications due to multiple
comparisons and spatial autocorrelation; and, (6) lim-
ited engagement with theory. Based on these findings,
we then propose directions for future research and
best practices for researchers seeking to understand
the relationship between weather and climate
opinions.
2.Methods
We reviewed articles that empirically investigate the
relationship between public opinion about climate
change and experience with local weather, climate,
and extreme events. We used a systematic search
strategy on the Google Scholar database using the
following keywords: ‘climate,’ ‘warming,’ ‘percep-
tions,’ ‘opinion,’ ‘weather,’ ‘experience,’ and
‘extreme.’We also considered articles citing or cited by
relevant identified articles. Our initial search query
identified about 16 000 results. To refine our search
further, we considered only the first 25 pages of search
results, since results are sorted in descending order by
search relevance.
We then used the following criteria for inclusion:
(1) the article must be published in a peer-reviewed
academic journal; (2) the article must describe a pri-
mary empirical study (reviews or primarily theoretical
papers were excluded); (3) the article must examine at
least one of the following constructs related to opinion
about climate change or global warming: belief that
climate change is happening and/or human caused,
worry or concern about climate change, or support for
climate change mitigation and/or adaptation policies;
and (4) the article must examine at least one of the fol-
lowing in association with climate change opinion:
weather conditions, extreme weather events, or cli-
mate indicators (e.g. temperature or precipitation
anomalies or trends). Our search is inclusive of papers
published through 1 February, 2019.
Based on these criteria, we identified 73 articles for
inclusion in this review. These articles were published
between 2006 and 2019.
3. Results and discussion
3.1. Trends inweather effects on climate opinion
There is modest support for an association between
weather experience or extreme events (broadly
defined) and climate opinion. Of the 73 articles
included in this review, 59 (81%) measure a direct
effect on climate opinion from either subjective
experience or measured exposure to a variety of
weather, climate, or extreme event indicators. How-
ever, the magnitude of this effect varies widely. As
discussed below, there are substantial differences in
measurement across studies that complicate interpre-
tation ormeta-analysis of these results.
3.1.1. Subjective experience and climate opinion
Of the articles reviewed, 32 (44%) examine the
association between subjective experience with abnor-
mal weather conditions or extreme events and climate
opinion. Studies that examine subjective experience
ask participants to self-report whether they have
personally experienced a specific weather-related
phenomenon, trend, or extreme event [13–15,
24, 32, 36, 38, 46–50], whether they have experienced
its effects [21, 25, 51–54], or if they have generally
experienced unusual weather patterns [55, 56]. Alter-
natively, some studies ask participants if they have
personally experienced the effects of climate change
itself [37, 57–59]. In some studies, survey questions
about personal experience are also combined with
external observational data on weather conditions or
trends [15, 20, 32, 36, 38, 39, 46, 50, 60, 61].
Based on this literature, there is a fairly robust rela-
tionship between perceived or subjective experience
4
We define ‘weather’ broadly as short-term (e.g. daily) conditions
or variations in the atmosphere, and ‘climate’ as longer-term
conditions or variations.
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and related climate opinion questions. Of 32 papers
that address the association between self-reported
experiences and climate opinion, 27 (84%) find evi-
dence for such a relationship. For example, a large
study of surveys from 119 countries found that per-
ception of rising temperatures at the local level was an
important predictor of climate risk perceptions [14].
In general, these studies suggest that people who think
they have experienced the effects of global warming
(or have experiences of extreme weather) also tend to
believe that global warming is happening and to be
more concerned about it. However, these studies
alone do not establish a causal relationship between
experience and opinion. Despite the associations iden-
tified in these papers, climate opinions may also shape
the weather-related experiences that people self-
report, as we discuss in section 3.1.4 below.
3.1.2. The effect of objective temperature experiences on
climate opinion
Of the reviewed articles, 51 (70%) examine the
association between externallymeasuredweather vari-
ables or extreme events and climate opinion. Of these,
46 (90%) used some measurement of temperature or
temperature-related extreme events (e.g. heat or cold
waves). Temperature is typically operationalized as
either the absolute air temperature over a certain time
period, or a temperature anomaly: the difference in the
absolute temperature from a long-term base period. A
small number of studies also examine trends in
temperature over a set time period. The prevalent use
of temperature as an independent variable likely arises
from its conceptual salience with global warming or
climate change, as well as the ease with which
temperature observations from weather stations or
gridded data can be joined with survey responses by
location.
Among studies that have tested temperature as an
independent variable predicting climate opinion,
some provide evidence for a ‘local warming’ effect (e.g.
[5, 6, 10, 11, 15, 18, 62]), showing that elevated tem-
peratures in the short term (daily tomonthly) are asso-
ciated with increased concern about climate change,
belief that it is happening and human-caused, or pol-
icy support. For example, in one analysis, temperature
anomalies in the week prior to a survey predict opi-
nion about whether global warming is happening [9].
These same studies indicate that the magnitude of the
effect is relatively low and not persistent as the experi-
ence of elevated temperatures recedes over time (e.g.
[9, 63]). Other studies that have examined associations
between short-term temperature and climate opinions
have found no effect [7, 19, 64].
There are mixed findings among studies that have
investigated the relationship between longer-term tem-
peratures or temperature trends and public opinion.
The largest recent study of US survey data (N=348,
500) from1999 to 2017finds that higher average annual
temperatures at the state level are associated with a
small but robust increase inworry about climate change
[65]. Thisfinding is reflected in similar studies that have
examined seasonal-to-annual temperatures, e.g.
[7, 8, 17, 19, 20, 63, 64, 66–68]. For example three stu-
dies find that 10 year summer temperature trends are
positively related to beliefs about human-caused global
warming in the US [19, 64, 66]. In addition, an index
representing the ratio of previous record high tempera-
tures to record low temperatures over several years
(with more record high temperatures expected under a
warming climate) is associated with estimates of
county-level climate opinions in the US [12, 69]. How-
ever, other studies that have focused on longer-term
temperatures or trends have found little to no effect on
climate opinions [28, 30, 32, 34, 70, 71].
The few longitudinal studies that have examined
how changes in climate opinions may be associated
with local temperature observations have generally
found little to no effect. For example, monthly US
temperature anomalies do not predict changes in opi-
nions over 2.5 years from 2008 to 2011 [31], and there
were minimal effects of monthly temperature anoma-
lies in a large panel analysis of Cooperative Congres-
sional Election Study data over a four-year period
from2010 to 2014 [72].
3.1.3. The effect of objective non-temperature experiences
on climate opinion
While temperature is the most commonly used
observed weather variable, other studies examine
precipitation observations (e.g. [10, 64, 65]) or derived
climatic variables (such as drought indices) (e.g.
[30, 67]). Of studies that use objective weather data, 21
(41%) use data related to precipitation. In contrast to
temperature, most studies have identified little to no
association between precipitation or related variables
alone and climate opinions [10, 31, 32, 64]. For
example, a very large study in the US [65] shows no
relationship betweenmedian annual precipitation and
climate opinion. By contrast, an earlier US study [20]
does find that the seasonal snowfall anomaly (as
compared to the 30 year average) predicts beliefs about
whether global warming is happening in the US
However, this variable is not independent from
temperature, since the occurrence and amount of
snow is related to air temperature.
Beyond temperature and precipitation, some stu-
dies have also examined a range of impacts and occur-
rences of various extreme weather events. Of studies
using external measures rather than self-reported
experiences, 20 (39%) include measures related to
extreme weather events. Several of these studies have
used published aggregated indices of weather extremes
as predictors of climate opinions, such as the US
Climate Extremes Index that combines temperature,
precipitation, drought severity, and landfalling tropi-
cal storms [28, 30, 33, 73]. These studies do not find a
relationship between these aggregated extremes indi-
ces and climate opinions.
3
Environ. Res. Lett. 14 (2019) 113001 PDHowe et al
A further set of studies focus explicitly on the rela-
tionship between the impacts of weather-related
extreme events and climate opinions, with mixed
results. Several US studies utilize the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration’s Storm Events
Database [74] (or derived products like the Spatial
Hazard Events and Losses Database [75]). This dataset
records the impacts of weather-related events that
cause loss of life, injuries, or major property damage,
or are unusual enough to generate media attention
(georeferenced at the county or forecast area level). For
example, one study [76] examines weather-related
property damage at the county level and does not find
a direct effect on climate opinions. Another recent
example [46] finds that hurricanes, tornadoes, floods,
and droughts are unrelated to climate opinions, in
contrast to self-reported experience for certain types
of events. This finding is echoed by several other stu-
dies [17, 71, 72]. Yet, a few other studies do find that
indices of extreme weather events predict climate opi-
nion, such as a study of US Gulf Coast counties [67], a
national US study using natural hazard fatalities [70],
and a national US study using the number of extreme
weather events by region [22, 23].
A final set of papers involve case studies of certain
communities affected by extreme weather events, or
the effect of a specific event on changes in climate opi-
nion. A set of studies in the UK [21, 24, 53] focus on
the experience of floods; these find that flood impacts
predict climate opinion. However, an earlier UK study
[54] finds that flood experiences does not affect cli-
mate opinion, and a recent study suggests that coping
capacitymoderates the negative emotions from a flood
event that would motivate opinion change [52]. A
recent study in theUS [77] surveyed four communities
exposed to tornadoes or wildfires and finds that event
proximity does not predict climate opinion, as
opposed to subjective harm from the event. Similarly,
case studies of particular events like a flood event in
Boulder, Colorado [78] or a drought in the US Mid-
west [29] show no effect on climate opinions. By con-
trast, a study in New Jersey finds that hurricane
exposure predicts support for pro-climate political
candidates [27].
3.1.4. The effect of climate opinion on perceptions or
subjective experiences of local weather
A subset of studies focuses on how people perceive
weather or climate conditions at the local level. Rather
than using beliefs about global climate change as a
dependent variable, these studies examine whether
people perceive the climate in their local area to be
getting warmer, whether recent seasons are warmer or
colder than normal, or related local climate trends
[25, 35, 36, 38, 39, 50, 60, 61, 71, 79–81].
Multiple studies have found that these subjective
experiences of local weather or climate conditions are
associated with broader climate opinions and political
affiliation or ideology. In short, people who are already
more concerned about global warming are more likely
to think they have experienced its impacts, or have
experienced weather conditions consistent with global
warming [35, 36, 38, 39, 61, 71]. These trends are typi-
cally attributed to motivated reasoning or related
phenomena.
Although studies of local climate perceptions show
that climate opinions shape such perceptions, they
also show that people are often able to detect a signal of
local weather or climate despite biases created by
motivated reasoning. For example, a study of Okla-
homa residents found that they were able to perceive
local seasonal temperature and precipitation anoma-
lies despite biases introduced by political ideology
[81]. Similarly, a study in Norway found that percep-
tions of seasonal temperature and precipitation were
strongly associated with measured conditions while
also exhibiting biases associated with climate opinions
[36]. Detection of climate trends at the local level may
be limited to larger-magnitude variations across large
areas; however, a study in Florida found that five-year
trends in temperature were not associated with per-
ceived temperature trends across the state, although
trends in precipitation were faintly detected [32]. The
types of self-reported weather experiences shaped by
climate opinions have not yet been fully explored, but
there are suggestions that temperature-related experi-
ences are more sensitive to biases driven by climate
opinions than experiences related to precipitation or
other extreme events [36, 38, 50].
3.2.Measurement diversity
A major constraint on systematic comparison of this
literature stems from measurement diversity.
Although the papers we review generally share the aim
of identifying how experiences with weather and
climate influence climate opinions, both the suite of
treatments (i.e. potential explanatory factors) and the
specific outcome variables of interest vary consider-
ably. Whether experience is measured through self-
reported or objective data,many additional non-trivial
discrepancies exist. Survey questions are worded
differently, and weather and climate data are inte-
grated from diverse sources with varying spatiotem-
poral extent and resolution. Furthermore, climate
indicators are operationalized in many different ways,
and distinct approaches exist for spatially and tempo-
rallymatching climate indicators to respondents. First,
we explore the diversity in measurements of physical
climate changes, the treatment of interest. Then, we
consider the diversity of dependent variables that
scholars have examined.
3.2.1. Heterogeneousmeasurement and conceptualization
of independent variables
Measurements of climate and weather (the treatment
variables) vary considerably across the studies we
review. As noted previously, a first-order distinction is
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between the 32 papers that measure the effect of
subjective or reported experiences of weather and
climate, versus the 51 papers that examine the
influence of objectively measured weather and climate
changes. Ten papers examine both subjectively (self-
reported) and objectivelymeasuredweather or climate
changes.
Local temperature measurements used in these
studies vary in their use of absolute versus relative
values, spatial extents and time intervals, and data
sources. Temperature data for many studies are taken
from theGlobal or United StatesHistorical Climatolo-
gical Network, which is an integrated database of cli-
mate summaries from land surface stations subjected
to a common suite of quality assurance review. Station
data are limited, however, in their ability to represent
the continuous range of weather conditions across the
Earth’s surface. As distance increases from a station, its
accuracy in capturing local conditions declines. Thus,
it may be difficult to accurately represent weather
experiences for populations living distant from a
weather station (a challenge that is particularly pre-
valent in areas of the developing world with sparse sta-
tion networks). To address this issue, other studies use
gridded datasets derived from station and/or satellite
data that create a continuous surface of modeled
weather or climate variables. One example is the para-
meter-elevation regressions on independent slopes
model (PRISM) dataset [82], which combines data
from a variety of US monitoring networks. PRISM
employs a range of modeling techniques that incorpo-
rate the influences of topography, for example, to
derive spatially accurate estimates of climate para-
meters. Whether the use of these divergent data sour-
ces explains divergent findings has not been
systematically assessed. In particular, it is not clear
whether one type of data source provides climate data
closer to what individuals in a particular location actu-
ally perceive. As a result, it is impossible to carefully
diagnose the source of observed differences in treat-
ment effects between studies employing these different
datasets and associated indicators derived from these
datasets. Similarly, there are multiple different sources
of data and ways of calculating long-term temperature
trends and extremes, including a heat stress index [32],
climate extremes indices (e.g. [46]) and annual or sea-
sonal trends based on temperature minimums, max-
imums, ormeans (e.g. [61, 67]).
Other weather and climate measurements are also
characterized by these measurement inconsistencies.
For example, heavy precipitation must be measured
relative to some ‘normal’ base period or distribution,
whether as deviations or percentiles. Heavy precipita-
tion is also highly localized. In contrast, the extended
absence of precipitation (i.e. drought) has a much lar-
ger and more homogeneous spatial imprint than
heavy precipitation events, temperature anomalies or
heat waves; it is also measured very differently.
Drought can be measured through the duration of
consecutive dry days, but thus far analyses of drought
perceptions have relied on readily available indices
such as the Palmer Drought Severity Index [28, 73, 79]
or the US Drought Monitor [29, 68, 72]. Such indices,
however, were not originally designed from the per-
spective of understanding how people experience
weather and climate change but rather were designed
for use in climatological, agricultural, and similar pur-
poses. It remains unclear whether drought measure-
ments operationalized in this fashion are consistent
with how individuals perceive or experience drought.
Many papers that consider subjective experience
focus on experience with extreme events or disasters,
especially flooding [24, 47, 48, 52–54], but also tropical
cyclones, drought, wildfire, and other changes
[47, 49]. Such differences are non-trivial, as each event
carries very different risks, is associated with different
economic costs, and affects individuals and commu-
nities in very different ways. We need to better under-
stand the different interpretations of subjective
experiences in these varied contexts. At least one study
explores this topic with open-ended responses, which
provides insight into the diversity of interpretations of
personal experience [59]. Additional studies using
open-ended responses would be productive to under-
stand the variety of ways in which climate change is
expressed and perceived locally.
3.2.2. Heterogeneousmeasurement and conceptualization
of dependent variables
As with the independent variables, the variety of
dependent variables is also substantial (table 1). Stu-
dies examine a diverse range of climate experiences
and opinions, from whether individuals accurately
detect changes in their local area (measured instru-
mentally) [32, 35, 83], to whether measured (or
reported) changes are associatedwith increased aware-
ness, a change in affect or emotion [48, 52], beliefs (e.g.
[25, 76]), belief certainty [13, 37], risk perceptions (e.g.
[6]), self efficacy, mitigation or adaptation policy
preferences (e.g. [23, 62]), and intended behaviors.We
identified no studies that measured actual behavioral
changes. However, some studies measured behavioral
intentions, including political behaviors, such as sup-
port for green politicians [27], media use [83], and
intended reductions in energy use [24]. Most studies
rely on individual question items but some construct
narrow [70] or broad [65] risk perception indices from
multiple items.
3.2.3. Variation in geographic coverage
Examining the intersection of weather or climate and
perceived experience or climate opinions requires
careful attention to spatial considerations. Researchers
make decisions about the scale of the study (from local
to global), the distribution of individuals within the
study domain, the distribution of weather or climate
trends and events considered, and how climate data
will be matched with individuals in the study. The
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studies reviewed span the full range of local to global
analyses, but the vast majority are conducted within
the United States, andmany are national (table 2). The
spatial distribution of people and climate are given
varying degrees of attention. Samples may be selected
based on particular extreme weather events in order to
directly test the effects of those events (e.g. flooding).
In other cases, an exploratory approach is taken. In
some cases, respondents’ locations are known (i.e.
household addresses) and so analyses are performed at
the individual level (e.g. [31, 32, 38, 66]), whereas in
other cases respondents are aggregated by zip code,
county, or even state levels (e.g. [8, 12]). The varying
degrees of mismatch between respondent locations
and weather or climate ‘treatments’ introduces uncer-
tainties into any assessment of treatment effects.
Based on the geographic scope of studies identified
in the review, it is clear that more non-US research is
necessary, especially in China, India, and the global
South, which represent some of the areas most vulner-
able to climate change impacts. In addition, for studies
that focus on the effects of climate changes that have
relatively well-defined spatial signatures (e.g. wildfires,
flooding, hurricanes), careful attention should be paid
not only to the location of respondents within the geo-
graphic area, but also to how those respondents are
matched with their respective weather or climate
treatments. Weighting climate indicators according to
the spatial distribution of population densities within
a county or state, for example, is a relatively straight-
forward way to account for the uneven distribution of
both climate and population in any area (e.g. [1, 84]).
Population density grids are publicly available and
would improve estimates of treatment effects in places
that encompass large rural or sparsely-populated areas
in particular.
3.3.Methodological approaches
Although sharing a similar aim, the studies reviewed
here vary in their specific objectives and thus employ a
range of methods (table 3). They also build on a long
Table 1.Examples of survey questionwordings used as dependent variables in selected studies.
Concept Item Citation
Perceptions of localflooding fre-
quency change
Comparing the past 10 years with 20 or 30 years ago, do you think that number and
size of destructivefloods inNewHampshire have: [Increased; Stayed the same;
Decreased; Don’t know/no answer]
[80]
Global warming beliefs Recently, youmay have noticed that global warming has been getting some attention
in the news. Global warming refers to the idea that theworld’s average temperature
has been increasing over the past 150 years,may be increasingmore in the future,
and that theworld’s climatemay change as a result.What do you think?Do you
think that global warming is happening? [Yes; No;Don’t know]
[31]
Global warming beliefs Do you think climate change is a serious problem for thewhole world? [Not severe at
all; Not so severe; Somewhat severe; Very severe; Not clear]
[47]
Global warming beliefs Fromwhat you know about global climate change or global warming, which one of
the following statements comes closest to your opinion? [Global climate change has
been established as a serious problem and immediate action is necessary; There is
enough evidence that climate change is taking place and some action should be
taken;We don’t know enough about global climate change andmore research is
necessary beforewe take any actions; Concern about global climate change is exag-
gerated and no action is necessary; Global climate change is not occurring and this
is not a real issue.]
[72]
Perceived experience with climate
change
Have you experienced any extremeweather conditions that you interpret as caused by
long-term, global climate change? [Yes, probably; Do not know; Probably not;
Definitely not]
[60]
Support for climate policy I will support a national policy tomitigate climate change. [1=Strongly disagree;
7=Strongly agree]
[55]
Global warming risk perceptions How serious of a threat do you think global warming is to [You and your family; Your
local community; People of Florida; People in theUnited States; People in other
countries; Plants and animals] [1=Very serious; 4=Not at all serious]
[32]
Weather as evidence for or against cli-
mate change
The coldwinter which occurred during late 2010 suggests that climate changemay
not be happening. [5-point scale Strongly agree-Strongly disagree]
[26]
Concern about global warming Howmuch do you personally worry about global warming? [Agreat deal; A fair
amount; Only a little; Not at all]
[30]
Table 2.Overview of papers by focus
country.
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Table 3. List of articles included and brief description of relevant results.
Citation Brief summary
Akerlof et al, 2013 [59] In oneMichigan county, perceived personal experience of global warmingwas associatedwith heightened global warming risk perceptions. (Alger County,Michigan, United States)
Bergquist andWarshaw, 2019 [65] An index ofUS public opinion polls found that public concern about climate change peaked in 2000 and 2017 and coincidedwith state temperature anomalies. (United States)
Blennow et al, 2012 [55] Strength of belief in climate change and perception of local effects were found to predict climate adaptation opinions among private forest owners. (Portugal, Germany, Sweden)
Boag et al, 2018 [57] Although forestmanagers were aware of local environmental change, awareness was not associatedwith adaptive action to climate change. (Oregon, United States)
Bohr, 2017 [5] Very cold or warm temperature anomalies from a 5 year baseline predicted perceptions of global warming impacts. Temperature anomalies exacerbated political polarization over the causal
attribution of global warming. (United States)
Borick andRabe, 2014 [20] Seasonal snowfall and temperature departures fromnormal predicted beliefs about the existence of global warming; respondents reported that weatherwas important in shaping their views.
(United States)
Brody et al, 2008 [70] No correlation between long-term trend in number of warmer-than-average days per year and climate change risk perception. (United States)
Brooks et al, 2014 [6] Temperature anomalies on the day individuals were surveyedwas associatedwith concern about climate change. (United States)
Broomell et al, 2015 [58] Amulti-country survey found that respondents weremore likely to support generalmitigation efforts than specific actions ofmitigation, and supportwas predicted by personal experiences
with global warming. (Australia; Brazil; Canada; Chile; China; Germany; Spain; France;HongKong; Israel; India; Italy; Japan; Korea; Netherlands; Poland; Russia; SouthAfrica; Slovakia;
Sweden; Turkey; Taiwan;UnitedKingdom;United States)
Broomell et al, 2017 [35] Results from a randomized experiment found that individuals were generally able to perceive significant temperature anomalies but classified less extreme anomalies based on their global
warming beliefs. (United States)
Brulle et al, 2012 [28] National aggregate indices of extremeweather did not have an effect on aggregate public opinion about climate change over nine years. (United States)
Capstick and Pidgeon, 2014 [26] Individuals interpreted coldweather based on levels of pre-existing skepticism about climate change.However, after a period of abnormally cold temperatures, three times asmany people
interpreted the anomalies as evidence of the climate change.(UnitedKingdom)
Carlton et al, 2016 [29] After a period of drought in theUSMidwest in 2012, there were no significant changes in climate change beliefs or attitudes toward adaptation among agricultural advisors. (Indiana, Iowa,
Michigan,Nebraska, United States)
Carmichael and Brulle, 2017 [30] Weather events wereminimally associatedwith the level of concern about climate change; only extreme drought conditions were related to climate change concern. (United States)
Carmichael et al, 2017 [73] An analysis of the factors influencing public concern about climate change (between 2002 and 2013) found that extremeweather did not increase concern about climate change among
Democrats or Republicans. (United States)
Cutler, 2016 [76] Household income, political party affiliation, beliefs about climate change, and property damage from severeweather events were found to have an interactive effect to shape perceptions of
climate change risk. (United States)
Dai et al, 2015 [49] Perceived experiences of extremeweather events (particularly heatwaves) infive cities inChinawere strongly correlatedwith climate change beliefs. Physical orfinancial damages due to
extremeweather events strengthened the relationship. (China)
Demski et al, 2017 [21] Flooding experience in theUKwas associatedwith greater perceived vulnerability and risk perceptions of climate change, and support formitigation and adaptation policies. (United
Kingdom)
Deryugina, 2013 [7] Short-term temperature fluctuations (1 day–2weeks) had no effect on global warming beliefs, but longer-term fluctuations (1month–1 year)were predictors of global warming beliefs
according to an analysis of longitudinal survey data. Only respondents with conservative political ideologywere affected by temperature anomalies. (United States)
Donner andMcDaniels, 2013 [8] Aggregate climate change belief and concernwas correlated to nationalmean temperature anomalies over the previous 3–12months. (United States)
Druckman and Shafranek, 2016 [93] Participants whowere primed to think about temperatures over a long period of timewere less likely to overestimate the percentage of abnormally warmdays over the past year. Temperature
on the day of the survey was correlatedwith global warming belief, worry, and anthropogenic attribution among the control group, but not the primed group. (United States)














Fownes andAllred, 2018 [61] Respondents weremore likely to report that they had personally experienced climate changewhen surveyed on abnormally warmdays. Respondents who reported believing in climate change
weremore likely to report they had experienced climate change and the effect was stronger among thosewho attributed climate change to anthropogenic causes. (NewYork State, United
States)
Goebbert et al, 2012 [50] Actual weather changes were less predictive of perceived changes in local temperatures, but better predictors of perceived flooding and droughts. Beliefs about local changes in temperature
weremore politicized than beliefs about changes in precipitation. (United States)
Hamilton andKeim, 2009 [68] Winter warmingwas associatedwith a greater probability of perceiving local climate change, even after adjusting for unexplained regional differences. (19 counties in Alabama, Colorado,
Kansas, Kentucky,Maine,Mississippi, NewHampshire, Oregon,Washington, United States)
Hamilton and Stampone, 2013 [10] Climate change beliefs were predicted by temperature anomalies on the interview day and the previous day. Temperature effects were concentrated among thosewho identified as political
independents. (NewHampshire, United States)
Hamilton et al, 2016a [79] Older residents weremore likely to perceive that summer temperatures had increased. Three subgroups assumed to have greater experiencewith land including forest owners, year-round
residents, and long-term residents were neithermore nor less likely than others to perceive warming summer temperatures. (NortheastOregon, United States)
Hamilton et al, 2016b [80] Perceptions of flood riskwere associatedwith political ideology rather than physical vulnerability or personal experiencewith local weather changes. (NewHampshire, United States)
Howe and Leiserowitz, 2013 [38] Subjective experiences of seasonal average temperature and precipitation during the previous winter and summerwere related to recordedweather conditions and beliefs about global
warming. (United States)
Howe, 2018 [36] Respondents were sensitive to changes in temperature and precipitation, but global warming beliefs had a large effect on perceptions of seasonal temperature, and less on seasonal precipita-
tion. (Norway)
Joireman et al, 2010 [11] Respondents’ global warming beliefs were correlated with outdoor temperatures during the study. (NorthwesternUnited States)
Kaufmann et al, 2017 [12] Temperature anomalies accounted for spatial variation in the percentage of the population that believes that global warming is happening at the county level (United States)
Konisky et al, 2016 [22] There was a positive relationship between extremeweather experience and concern about climate change. However, the effect of extremeweather on public concernwas only significant for
recent weather events. (United States)
Krosnick et al, 2006 [13] People who believed they had experienced rising temperatures in recent years weremore likely to express belief in global warming. (United States)
Lee et al, 2015 [14] Amulti-country survey found country level variation in the predictors of climate change awareness and risk perceptions. Perceived temperature changewas a significant predictor across
nearly all geographies, but strongest in Africa andAsia. (119 countries)
Lee et al, 2018 [62] Respondents reported temporarily higher levels of support for agricultural adaptation policies after exposure to abnormally warm temperatures. (Michigan, United States)
Li andZaval, 2011 [15] Respondents surveyed in theUS andAustralia that believed the day that theywere surveyedwaswarmer than usual expressed greater concern about climate change (andweremorewilling to
donatemoney to a global-warming charity) compared to thosewho thought the daywas cooler than usual. (United States; Australia)
Lo and Jim, 2015 [108] Residents’ concern about climate changewas associatedwith perceptions of changes in local temperatures and cyclone frequency. (HongKong, China)
Lujala et al, 2015 [51] Norwegians who reported that they experienced natural hazard damages weremore concerned about personal consequences of climate change. (Norway)
Lyons et al, 2018 [46] Subjective experience of extremeweather events was associatedwith climate change beliefs for less visible events (droughts and polar vortex) as opposed tomore overt events like tornadoes,
hurricanes, and floods.Objective indicators were unrelated to climate opinion. (United States)
Marlon et al 2018 [32] Respondents were unable to detect 5 year increases in temperature, but some could detect change in precipitation. Climate change risk perceptionsweremore strongly predicted by subjective
experiences of environmental change, climate change beliefs, and political ideology compared to local weather variables. (Florida, United States)
Marquart-Pyatt et al, 2014 [33] Variation in a climate extremes index did not influence perceptions of the timing of climate change and had a negligible effect on perceptions of the seriousness of climate change. (United
States)
McCright et al, 2014 [39] Temperature anomalies influenced perceivedwarming but not attribution ofwarmer-than-usual winter temperatures (to global warming). Abnormally warm temperatures were influenced
















[31] Neither local temperature nor precipitation anomalies predicted longitudinal changes in public opinion about climate change. (United States)
Myers et al, 2013 [37] Perceived personal experience of global warmingwas associatedwith increased global warming belief certainty. Inversely, high belief certainty influenced perceptions of personal experience.
(United States)
Niles andMueller, 2016 [60] Farmers who expressed belief in anthropogenic climate changeweremore likely to perceive increased temperatures than farmers who did not express belief in climate change. (NewZealand)
Ogunbode et al, 2018 [52] Respondents with a strong ability to copewithfloodingwere unlikely to experience negative emotions thatmight prompt personal action tomitigate climate change; coping abilitymoderates
the link between flood experience andmitigation intentions. (UnitedKingdom)
Ogunbode et al, 2019 [53] Personal experience of aflooding event predicted perceived threat from climate change, and indirectly predictedmitigation responses among individuals who attributed thefloods to climate
change. (UnitedKingdom)
Palm et al, 2017 [72] Recent experiencewith hot summers, warmwinters, droughts, and natural disasters wasminimally associatedwith attitude change related to anthropogenic climate change. (United States)
Potoski et al, 2015 [91] Wealthier respondents were found to be overrepresented in surveys duringwarmer temperatures. Exposure to unseasonable temperatures was correlatedwith reduced concern about climate
change. (United States)
Ray et al, 2017 [23] Individuals who experienced recent extremeweather events weremore likely to support climate change adaptation policy in general, but the effect was variable across specific adaptation
policies and diminishedwith time. (United States)
Ripberger et al, 2017 [81] Survey respondents generally perceived climate anomalies, especially when anomalies were extreme and persistent; this findingwas robust to political differences. (Oklahoma, United States)
Risen andCritcher, 2011 [16] In an experimental study, participants who experienced higher temperatures weremore likely to believe in the existence of global warming. (Cornell University andUniversity of Chicago,
United States)
Rudman et al, 2013 [27] New Jersey residents who experienced significant hurricane impacts weremore likely to support politicianswho supported of climate change policies. (New Jersey, United States)
Schuldt andRoh, 2014 [92] Among climate skeptics, those primedwith coldweather exhibited a decrease in belief in global warming, but not climate change. (UpstateNewYork, United States)
Scruggs andBenegal, 2012 [63] In a large survey dataset, therewas amodest positive relationship between themost recent seven-day temperature anomaly and the likelihood of reporting that global warming is occurring.
(United States)
Shao andGoidel, 2016 [67] Political orientationwas found to have a stronger influence on perceptions of local weather conditions compared to objective weather conditions. Local weather perceptions were found to
influence climate change attitudes. (United States)
Shao et al, 2014 [19] Individuals who had experienced increasing summer temperatures weremore likely to perceive immediate impacts and severity of global warming. (United States)
Shao et al, 2016 [64] Individuals exposed to long-term trends of abnormally warm summer temperatures and cooler spring temperatures weremore likely to perceive the existence of anthropogenic global
warming. (United States)
Shao, 2016 [71] Individuals who expressed belief that global warming is happening, and should be a priority weremore likely to perceive recent weather anomalies. Perceivedweatherwasmuchmore
predictive of global warming beliefs than observedweather. (United States)
Shao, 2017 [66] Warmerwinter temperatures and cooler spring temperatures over the past 10 yearswas associatedwith the belief that overall global temperatures have been rising. (United States)
Shepard et al, 2018 [78] Residents connected flooding events to climate change despite contradictory scientific claims about the relationship. Events did not change existing climate change beliefs but did facilitate a
greater sense of vulnerability and increased awareness about climate change risk. (Boulder County, Colorado,United States)
Shum, 2012 [34] The state of the economy had a significant effect on attitudes toward emissions reduction, however, annual temperature deviations did not. (Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus;
Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg;Malta; Netherlands; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Slovakia;
Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; United Kingdom)















Sun andHan, 2018 [47] Climate-related disaster experience did not have a significant impact on perceptions of global warming severity or perceived personal impact. (Taiwan)
Taylor et al, 2014 [25] Respondents perceived heat waves and hot summer temperatures as less commonduring their lifetimes.However, periods of heavy rainfall, coastal erosion, andmildwinters were perceived
to have increased in frequency. Climate change beliefs were predicted by perceived changes in hot andwet-weather related events. (UnitedKingdom)
van der Linden, 2014 [48] Personal experience with extremeweather events predicted climate risk perceptions, but risk perceptions were also strongly related to affect. (UnitedKingdom)
Wang and Lin, 2017 [83] The occurrence of a typhoon predicted perceived experience of unusual weather amongChinese respondents, while abnormally warm summer temperatures did not. Typhoon occurrence
also indirectly predicted global warming belief certainty and attitudes towardmitigation behavior. (China)
Wang, 2017 [56] Personal experience with climate change impacts positively predicted climate change beliefs. (China)
Whitmarsh, 2008 [54] Flood victims did not exhibit a significant difference fromnon-victims in their understanding of and responses to climate change. However, experience of air pollution significantly influ-
enced perceptions of climate change and behavioral responses. (south England, UnitedKingdom)
Zahran et al, 2006 [109] Local temperature trends predicted climate change policy support, as did sea level rise risk. (United States)
Zanocco et al, 2018 [77] An analysis of selectedUS communities exposed to extremeweather events found that reported harm alignedwith proximity and community damages from the event. However, interpreta-
tions of the events and attributions to climate changewere guided by political ideology.(Laurel County, Kentucky;WinstonCounty,Mississippi; Yavapai County, Arizona, LakeCounty,
California, United States)













history of exploiting natural weather variations to
study social science phenomena. Often, weather is
used as an econometric ‘instrument’: a source of
random variation that predicts a variable of interest
and thus helps to estimate an endogenous variable’s
causal effect on an outcome of interest. For example,
scholars have used rainfall variation to study the
relationship between economic growth and civil con-
flict [85], the relationship between poverty and crime
[86], and the relationship between riots and property
value [87]. Scholars in both economics and political
science have also examined the direct causal effect of
weather variation on economic and political outcomes
[88–90].
Scholarship on weather and public opinion can
theoretically exploit this same variation. Studies of
weather and public opinion can thus benefit from the
fact that weather is a direct object of interest (the
‘treatment’), and that plausible sources of exogenous
variation in this treatment are readily available. Yet,
the literature reviewed here is divided by its attention
to causal inference.
3.3.1. The limits ofmodel-dependent inference
At one pole, a number of papers describe associations
between weather experiences and climate opinions
without explicit attention to causal identification.
These papers rely on multivariate controls to estimate
the the effect of weather on diverse outcomes.
However, these studies face certain limitations.
First, weather conditions are spatially autocorrelated;
in other words, conditions are likely to bemore similar
for participants located closer to each other. Spatial
dependence is inherent in many human and physical
processes. Traditional regressionmodels assume inde-
pendence between observations. However, when
studying the relationship between weather and public
opinion, it is particularly important to account for
spatial dependence in predictor variables. This will
reduce the chance of underestimating standard errors
and the likelihood of Type I errors (or incorrectly
rejecting a null hypothesis). Multi-level models, clus-
tered standard errors, or geographically weighted
regression are several methods to account for geo-
graphic structure in predictors. However, most papers
focused on the relationship between weather and cli-
mate opinions do not attempt to account for possible
errors introduced by spatial autocorrelation using
these or other methods, nor do they attempt to mea-
sure the extent to which spatial autocorrelation is pre-
sent in their modeled regression residuals (though
see [38]).
Second, studies that rely on self-reportedmeasures
of weather exposure face an additional inferential
threat. In these cases, it can be difficult to tell whether
public opinion responds to weather exposure, or per-
ceptions of weather exposure are motivated by under-
lying opinions (see section 3.1.4 above).
Third, because weather varies geographically, geo-
graphic patterns of a particular weather variable may
sometimes coincide with the geographic patterns of
other unmeasured social, cultural, political, or demo-
graphic predictors. This means that meteorological
variables may be correlated with other latent phenom-
ena that are also causal drivers of a particular depen-
dent variable. For example, if a period of cold weather
strikes the central US while coastal areas are hotter
than normal, then this weather pattern will be strongly
correlated with underlying patterns of American poli-
tical geography. This correlation will bias a cross-sec-
tionalmultivariate analysis that predicts opinion using
cold weather experiences. A related complication
arises due to the possibility of multiple comparisons.
Weather and climate datasets contain a wide range of
variables that may be used as predictors of, for exam-
ple, individual survey responses. These variables can
be aggregated over multiple time periods selected by
the researchers. Without adjustment, multiple com-
parisons among predictors can increase the risk of
inferential errors.
3.3.2. Causal identification of weather on perceptions
A limited set of papers address these methodological
issues head-on. These papers use as-if random varia-
tion in weather as the basis for their research design.
Of course, most weather patterns are not randomly
assigned across a large country or region. Instead,
causal identification claims rest on the idea that,
conditional on a particular area or geography, varia-
tion inweather is as-if random.
These papers thus exploit randomness in short-
term or local weather conditions to test how weather
extremes shape public opinion [7, 9, 65]. According to
the logic of these papers, weather patterns vary more
arbitrarily within a given county or local area. These
differences can be causally identified. By contrast,
when everyone in a given area is simultaneously trea-
ted with a large event like a hurricane or regional heat
wave, then our efforts to understand the causal effect
of weather will be compromised by non-random fac-
tors that are simultaneously associated with both
weather trends and climate opinions.
These threats to inference can be managed through
the inclusion of geographic fixed effects, preferably at
the local level. Yet, only a handful of papers covered by
this review include fixed or random effects at any level,
including regional [20, 33, 46, 68], state [7, 9, 39, 91], or
geographies below the state level (e.g. county, city,
weather station) [9, 22, 36, 49, 65, 76, 77, 79].
Further, these studies would then benefit from
demonstrating that, conditional on geographic fixed
effects, populations which receive a particular weather
treatment are identical to those that do not (but see [9]
who do show that observed covariates cannot predict
weather fluctuations). Instead, some articles simply
assume that ‘weather fluctuations are as good as ran-
dom once geographic controls are included’ ([7],
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p 406). More work needs to be done by the research
community to understand whether or when this
assumption is founded.
When pooling data over time, articles should also
include time dummies to control for secular shocks
[9, 31, 33, 62, 65, 81] or other more sophisticated con-
trols such as linear time trends [65]. Similarly,
between-country analyses should utilize country-level
fixed or random effects [34, 63].
While the majority of observational studies
reviewed relied on cross-sectional statistical analysis, a
growing group of papers exploit panel data. These
papers provide traction in estimating whether shifts in
weather conditions are linked to shifting public opi-
nions [8, 19, 28, 30, 31, 34, 37, 63, 65, 81]. Their results
are not always consistent with cross-sectional studies
(see above). In part, the drivers of shifts in climate opi-
nions may not be the same as the drivers of absolute
climate opinion levels. At the same time, panel analysis
controls for a greater number of potential omitted
variables, including any factors that are time-invariant
in two-way fixed effect specifications.
An even smaller set of papers (n=5) involve
researcher-controlled experimental tests. Since
researchers cannot control weather itself, these papers
tend to test the causal effect ofmessages about extreme
weather or exposure to particular extreme weather
prompts. For example [18, 92], use a survey experi-
ment to test whether public opinion in the aftermath
of an extreme event changes whether a survey gauges
their opinion on ‘climate change’ or ‘global warming’.
Another study [93] evaluates how shaping the prompt
used to encourage evaluation of weather experiences
shapes opinion. Other studies examine the effect of
information, heat-related, or problem-severity primes
[11, 18]. The lone article reviewed that used lab experi-
ments [16] finds that warmth and thirst both increased
subject belief in climate change and desertification
risks. Beyond direct experience, climate-related
experiences may also occur indirectly through expo-
sure to media coverage or communication with other
people such as friends or family. In addition, media
coverage may interact with direct experience in influ-
encing climate opinions. Future research should
examine how such indirect experiences, and commu-
nication about direct experiences, might influence cli-
mate opinions. For example, such research could
combine techniques to measure exposure to weather-
related events with emerging techniques to measure
exposure tomedia content [94] or online activity [95].
More broadly, the vast majority of articles
reviewed here are quantitative in their approach.
These articles all rely on cross-sectional or panel analy-
sis of survey datasets. Only two articles we reviewed
approached the study of opinion through qualitative
interview-based or ethnographic lenses [57, 78]. For
example [57], draws from 50 interviews with land-
owners inOregon. These studies remind us that public
attitudes towards climate change should not simply be
reduced to survey scales. Instead, there is value in
understanding the rich and multidimensional content
of climate opinions, and understanding the ways in
which weather experiences construct these beliefs. In
general, this approach is under-represented in the
existing literature. Some excellent work on this topic
fell outside this review’s sampling strategy, since it has
been published in book form. For example [96], pre-
sents an ethnographic study on public experiences
with an unusually mild winter in a Norwegian town.
The book outlines how public engagement with cli-
mate change is shaped by social efforts to regulate
emotions. In line with works like these, scholars with
expertise in interview, focus-group. Focus-group and
ethnographic methods could make a major contrib-
ution to this literature by expanding the scope of
research onweather and public opinion.
3.4. The need for theoretical context and integration
The studies reviewed draw on theoretical frameworks
from across many disciplines. Some studies forego
theoretical groundings and limit their focus to doc-
umenting empirical associations (e.g. [10, 66, 73]),
however, many [16, 48, 59, 61, 77, 83] contextualize
their work using one of two psychological theories:
dual-process theory [97], which emerged from the
cognitive-experiential self theory [98], and construal
level theory (CLT) [99].
Dual-process theory distinguishes between two
parallel and interacting modes of information proces-
sing—experiential (also called System 1) and analytical
(System 2). Experiential processing is fast, and driven
by affect and intuition. It encodes reality through con-
crete images and emotions [98]. Analytical (System 2)
processing is conscious, deliberative, and compara-
tively slow. It employs abstract symbols, words, and
numbers to encode reality. Critically, experiential pro-
cessing predicts attitudes and behaviors much more
strongly than analytical processing because it requires
less cognitive effort [100]. However, both systems
operate together to support judgments and decision-
making. Although their interactions can be highly
nuanced depending on context andmay relate to other
key psychological aspects like emotion [101], we high-
light the potential importance of experiential versus
analytical processing for individual interpretation of
their weather-related experiences (figure 1).
CLT theorizes the nature and importance of psy-
chological distance [99]. CLT argues that we under-
stand and interact with the world according to the
perceived ‘psychological distance’ of different stimuli.
Distances are measured along different dimensions
including space, time, and hypotheticality. Transcend-
ing our here-and-now selves requires different levels
of abstraction, or mental construal [99]. Higher levels
of construal and abstraction—and thus psychologi-
cally distant concepts—are expected to require more
analytical processing. Likewise, phenomena that are
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physically close in both time and space (or hypotheti-
cality)may inducemore experiential processing.
Given that experiential processing can be more
powerful than analytical processing in driving decision-
making and behavior, physically and psychologically
close experiences of climate change, such as abnormally
hot days, may influence climate opinions more than
longer-term, gradual or distant climatic change. And
indeed, the effect of short-termweather (e.g. on the day
of a survey) on climate opinions has been demonstrated
in many studies [10, 11, 16, 61, 93]. However, using
recent or available information about the weather or
extreme events can also decrease climate risk percep-
tions [102, 103].
Moreover, the natural variability of weather and
seasonal cycles (including winter, even in a much war-
mer world)make it inherently problematic to empha-
size experiential processing and limit analytical
reasoning inmotivating climate actions. Likewise, gra-
dual trends in climate can be difficult to detect against
the backdrop of natural climate variability. Thus,
many studies that examine the influence of subtle cli-
mate trends or anomalies on climate opinions find
essentially no effects at all [28, 31, 32, 72].
While experiential and analytic processing under-
lie all reasoning about climate change to some extent
[100], neither imply a specific result for climate opi-
nions. Individual reactions to weather experiences will
thus be influenced by values, worldviews, associations,
and emotions. Similarly, changes to the ‘psychological
distance’ of climate change can have diverse effects. A
distant frame may invoke analytical reasoning,
whereas a more proximate perspective may be more
emotionally engaging [104]. While either frame could
potentially increase motivation to reduce climate
change more than the other, psychologically close
frames, regardless of whether they are geographically
near or far, are likely to bemost engaging.
4. Conclusions
The growing number of articles to study the relation-
ship between climate experiences and climate opinion
highlight sustained interest among researchers on this
topic. Yet, our review reveals substantial heterogeneity
of research setting, variable choice, methodological
approach, and theoretical frameworks. In light of these
differences, systematic comparisons remain difficult.
In general, scholars have found modest evidence that
short-term variation in temperature increases climate
opinions. However, the size of the temperature-
opinion effect—if present—is likely to be small.
Efforts to identify the links between shifts in precipita-
tion rates and extreme weather events also remain
unsettled.
Practically, if climatic anomalies exhibited a large
influence on public opinion (for example, equivalent
to the influence of political affiliation on climate opi-
nion in the US) such a large effect would likely have
been detected, given the multi-decade research record
reviewed here.However, evenmodest effectsmay have
Figure 1.Conceptual diagramof contextual factors that relate to climate change opinions. Concepts range in distance and time from
local/short-term to distant/long-term (x-axis) aswell as in psychological distance (y-axis). Climate change opinionsmay be shaped by
local weather experiences. In turn, climate opinionsmay influence perceptions of local to regional weather or extreme events.
Psychologically near concepts, regardless of whether they are near or distant in space or time, are likely to bemore compelling in
communication.
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important consequences for future public opinion
trends as temperatures rise and experiences with unu-
sual weather accumulate; long-term studies may
enable better detection of such effects [105]. These
cumulative impacts of climate changemay yet be suffi-
cient to motivate local to national political action. At
the same time, scholars should remind policymakers
that retrospective evidence from previous weather
conditions or climate trends is limited in its applic-
ability to future conditions. An important considera-
tion for future research is the extent to which local
weather conditions or anomalous events become nor-
malized among current and future populations. For
example, there are hints that local temperature
anomalies quickly become unremarkable in public
discourse [106]. Such acclimatization may hinder the
ability of populations to perceive the true magnitude
of underlying climate trends and limit the general-
izability of findings about the effect of past weather on
opinion.
We particularly urge researchers in this space to
pay careful attention to research design. The combina-
tion of georeferenced surveys with georeferenced
weather observations allows researchers to reliably
estimate the unique local weather conditions for indi-
vidual survey respondents. This type of research
design is common among papers we reviewed. It offers
a major advance against research efforts that measure
associations between self-reported experiences and
opinions, which we suggest have a limited capacity to
identify the causal effect of weather on opinion. How-
ever, we also suggest researchers paymore attention to
the limitations imposed by geography: people living
close to each other are more likely to experience the
same weather conditions, yet people in close proxi-
mity to each other also tend to be more similar in gen-
eral (in terms of sociodemographics) than to people
farther away. This is also the case for climate change
opinions, where people in nearby communities tend
to have similar opinions [69]. This makes it challen-
ging to statistically identify how weather conditions or
a weather event may have influenced peopleʼs beliefs
and attitudes without careful attention to the distribu-
tion of weather events. Indeed, spatial dependence in
weather conditions may explain some of the variation
in effects shown in the literature. Researchers must be
particularly attentive to issues of spatial autocorrela-
tion, omitted variables, andmultiple comparisons.
One approach tomanaging geographic dependen-
cies is to conceptualize weather conditions prior to a
survey as a natural experimental stimulus. Natural
experiments, if well-designed, can manage problems
posed by omitted variables, spatial dependence and
multiple comparisons. These approaches pay part-
icular attention to the drivers of spatial variation in cli-
matic events, and often include local-scale fixed effects
in their specifications. In doing so, they can isolate
individuals who experience a weather event from
those who do not but are otherwise similar. Other stu-
dies provide strong causal identification by collecting
longitudinal data that allow changes in opinion to be
documented at the level of the individual.
Future research should also explore how context-
and place-dependent experiences with climate change
affect climate opinions and behaviors. Widely avail-
able weather and climate data, while useful for mea-
suring physical climate trends, may not correspond to
ways that people experience climate change in differ-
ent places with varying cultural or environmental con-
texts. While our review did not explicitly focus on
non-weather-related experiences of climate change,
subsequent studies could separately investigate how
such experiences, such as sunny-day flooding due to
sea-level rise, the impacts of ocean acidification, or
glacial retreat shape climate change opinions. Further,
previous reviews have called for research in more
diverse geographic contexts [40, 41]. We echo this call,
and emphasize the particular importance of additional
research in the global South wheremany communities
will experience disproportionate impacts from climate
change.
We also note the apparent absence of studies that
examine the effects of climate-related experiences on
realized behavior (though see [107]). Instead, virtually
all quantitative literature on this topic uses survey-
based measurements of opinions or, at best, beha-
vioral intentions. We suggest that researchers give
particular attention to new social and political out-
come variables that can increase the external validity of
research on this topic. For example, do climate-related
experiences increase the propensity of individuals to
undertake adaptive planning? Can extreme events
increase public uptake of new energy technologies? Do
climate-related experiences shape political participa-
tion or voting preferences? Behaviors among influen-
tial subpopulations are also an important area
for future research. For example, media coverage
decisions by journalists with respect to extreme
weather events may influence how people vicariously
experience such events or interpret their own
direct experiences. We expect that studies linking
weather experiences to realized behavioral outcomes
will advance the state of the field.
Viewing the research reviewed through the lens of
psychological theory highlights additional avenues for
research. Understanding the constructed nature of
experience together with the importance of experi-
ential processing in driving judgments and decision
making suggests that it may be helpful to improve our
understanding of how measured climate changes
influence subjective beliefs about those changes. If this
pathway can be strengthened, perhaps through a
clearer understanding of what changes exactly are
interpreted as evidence of global climate change, com-
munication efforts could potentially be targeted to
reinforce causalmodels in the publicmind.
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In addition, paying more attention to affect and
emotion as factors that can influence perceived experi-
ence with global warming may yield communication
benefits. Overall, grounding future studies within rele-
vant theoretical or conceptual frameworks may also
help to focus data collection initiatives and facilitate
the identification of gaps in knowledge about how
objective and subjective weather drive climate opi-
nions. Helping the public make causal connections
between their experiences of climate change and its
causes, impacts, and solutions will continue to require
active engagement by climate scientists, the media,
and others who understand the linkages. The more
those linkages can be made in a way that engages
experiential processing and minimizes psychological
distance, the more meaningful and effective they are
likely to be.
In sum, despite the sustained attention that this
topic has received, substantial gaps still remain in our
understanding of public responsiveness to climate
change-related experiences. This systematic review
points out some of these gaps. As the global popula-
tion experiences weather that is increasingly outside
the range of historical memory, researchers, commu-
nicators, and policymakers must remain attentive to
these empirical needs to understand how climate
experiences shape public opinions and behaviors.
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